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The authors of this article are José González Mínguez and Carlos Vacas of the Directorate General Economics, 
Statistics and Research.
Beyond cyclical fl uctuations, the low average rates of increase in economic activity in the 
countries of the former EU 15 since the early 90s suggests there are structural obstacles re-
stricting growth potential. This economic sluggishness restricts the gains in well-being for 
European citizens measured by the rate of increase of per capita income, which led to an inter-
ruption in the convergence of the level of this variable relative to the US economy that had 
been in train since the post-war period. To improve these results calls for structural reforms to 
promote the use of the labour factor and to raise productivity growth rates, a need which has 
become more pressing amid growing global competition, rapid technological change and 
population ageing. European economic policymakers formally recognised this challenge when 
they launched the Lisbon Agenda at the March 2000 European Summit, a centrepiece of 
which is joint and consistent reforms of the institutional design of labour markets and of social 
protection systems.
These reforms particularly require more fl exible working arrangements, so that companies may 
be more adaptable to a constantly changing environment, and an overhaul of social protection 
systems, so they may generate the appropriate incentives for individuals to take up paid work 
and protect those who really need it.
Despite the long-term welfare benefi ts to be had, the reforms often entail costs for specifi c 
groups of individuals; accordingly, their implementation occasionally meets some degree of 
opposition. Frequently, the fi nal outcome is partial reforms, which do not achieve their goal: 
namely, that the fi nal design of labour markets and of social protection systems should be a 
consistent whole that allows high rates of employment to be achieved. On the contrary, partial 
reforms have occasionally given rise to labour markets that combine a high degree of protec-
tion for jobs that already exist with the presence of obstacles to specifi c groups of individuals 
joining the labour market.
Against this background, and across the range of the various Member States’ labour markets, it 
is worth paying particular attention to those that have been most successful in terms of obtaining 
higher employment rates, so as to explore the extent to which their institutional arrangements 
may be a valid example for the other members. It is believed this model can be found in the Nor-
dic economies, and particularly in Denmark. The Danish labour market is characterised by the 
coexistence of a high degree of fl exibility (obtained through relatively low dismissal costs) and a 
likewise high level of social protection (via generous unemployment benefi ts, albeit subject to a 
high degree of conditionality). The combination of fl exibility and security, which when applied to 
the labour market might appear in principle to be opposites, has given rise to the term “fl exicurity”. 
Under this term, the European Council has, by the end of 2007, to adopt a set of common prin-
ciples to underpin the new Employment Guidelines to be approved in 2008.
This article examines the Danish fl exicurity arrangements and assesses the extent to which 
labour market reforms in other European countries may draw on them. These labour markets 
are characterised in the second section on the basis of the institutional aspects that may de-
termine their results in terms of employment. The third section describes the Danish fl exicurity 
model. Section 4 analyses empirically the relationship between institutional characteristics and 
Introduction
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 128 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JANUARY 2008 FLEXICURITY AS A MODEL FOR EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS
employment testing the virtues of the Danish labour market arrangements. The article con-
cludes with some fi nal considerations.
As can be seen in Table 1, the use of the labour factor in both the former EU 15 and in the euro 
area is comparatively lower than in the United States, in terms both of the rate of employment 
and of the number of hours worked. The difference is greater for those groups traditionally less 
represented in employment, i.e. women, young people and the elderly. Moreover, this poorer 
relative performance of the European labour market in aggregate terms masks very marked 
differences across the different countries. In particular, the dispersion of employment rates is 
especially notable among the three aforementioned groups (see Table 2).
Identifying the causes behind these differences is a complex task in view of the manifold po-
tential determinants. On one hand, it has been argued [Blanchard (2004)] that the fewer hours 
worked in Europe in comparison with the United States is due to European citizens’ greater 
preference for leisure time. On the other hand, however, the scale of the differences observed 
in the use of the labour factor between the United States and Europe and, within the latter, 
across its different members, suggests that the institutional characteristics of each labour 
market must play a relevant explanatory role. Notable among such characteristics are employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL), unemployment benefi ts, active labour market policies, life-
long learning, product market regulation, taxation of the labour factor, trade union density and 
the degree of centralisation and coordination of collective bargaining.1
European labour markets: 
performance and 
institutional arrangements
1. In the comparison between the United States and Europe, this argument has been convincingly set out by Prescott 
(2004), who focuses on the differences in taxation on earned income. 
Employment rates: total and by group (a)
Total Male Female Young (b) Elderly (c)
EU 15 66.6 73.8 59.3 40.8 45.6 1,650.7
Euro area (d) 64.7 72.7 56.7 37.4 41.5 1,660.3
United States 71.5 77.6 65.6 53.9 60.8 1,804.0
Hours
worked
annually
SOURCES: OECD and Banco de España.
a. Employed as proportion of working age population in each group.
b. Includes those between 15 and 24 years of age.
c. Includes those between 55 and 64 years of age.
d. Euro area 12.
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN AND US LABOUR MARKETS (2005) TABLE 1
Total
(15-64)
Men
(15-64)
Men
(25-54)
Women
(15-64)
Young
(15-24)
Elderly
(55-64)
Dispersion (a) 5.2 3.9 2.2 8.1 13.5 11.4
Total employment rates, by sex and by age
SOURCES: OECD and Banco de España.
a. Dispersion is measured by the standard deviation in the sample.
LABOUR MARKET HETEROGENEITY IN THE EU15 (2005) TABLE 2
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EPL approximates the diffi culty of hiring and fi ring under labour market regulations. Conceiv-
ably, the effect of a high level of EPL on employment rates is ambiguous since, on one hand, 
it means that the dismissal of current employees is costly while, on the other, it makes compa-
nies more averse to take on new staff, precisely to avoid incurring such costs in the future.2 
Indeed, the empirical evidence is not conclusive concerning the impact of EPL on employment 
[see, for instance, Boeri (1999)], although it does suggest that it differs for different working 
population groups; thus, while it is favourable for the employment rates of middle-aged male 
workers, it tends to reduce those of individuals who face greater diffi culties joining the labour 
market, such as women, young people or the long-term unemployed.3 EPL differs frequently 
according to the type of contract and is usually more stringent for permanent employees than 
for temporary workers, giving rise to a dual labour market segmented between both groups of 
employees.
As opposed to the job protection that EPL offers, unemployment benefi ts protect workers in 
the event of becoming unemployed, serving to mitigate the negative impact on their income. 
Moreover, this variable may have a favourable effect on productivity, enabling unemployed 
workers to seek jobs more suited to their specifi c skills. However, benefi ts will foreseeably tend 
to reduce labour supply, by adversely affecting the incentives to return to a position of remu-
nerated employment. These effects depend on the maximum duration of the benefi t receipt 
period, on the level of replacement rates (or the ratio of benefi ts to the wage received previ-
ously) and on the conditions governing benefi t eligibility and its subsequent maintenance (such 
as total or partial forfeit in the event of turning down a job offer).
Active labour market policies (which include, among other measures, training for the unem-
ployed, job-search assistance programmes and subsidies for hiring the long-term unemployed) 
help match labour supply and labour demand. Accordingly, they may be expected to exert a 
positive impact on employment rates.4 The same may be said for the lifelong learning by work-
ers during their working life, since it increases the human capital of the employed, thereby 
raising the availability, within companies, of workers with the required skills.
The literature has identifi ed a series of channels through which product market regulation may 
affect employment in the long run. In particular, a regulatory environment more geared to com-
petition boosts labour supply to the extent that, by exerting downward pressure on the level of 
prices, it leads real wages to rise. Moreover, entry by new competitors tends to expand activ-
ity and, therefore, labour demand.
The tax wedge, or the difference between the gross labour costs borne by employers and the 
net labour income received by employees, adversely affects labour supply by infl uencing the 
incentives to accept a job and the choice of the number of hours worked. These effects would 
be especially relevant in the case of unskilled, low-income workers (in particular young people 
and women) who, in the event of high tax wedges, may respectively choose to extend their 
stay in the educational system or remain at home. This is why certain tax reforms rolled out in 
recent years have been aimed at these groups, since they are, moreover, those experiencing 
the highest unemployment rates.
2. It has further been argued that a high degree of EPL may be favourable in some respects in terms of labour productiv-
ity, since a durable working relationship with the same employer leads to greater incentives to invest in employee 
training. 3. See, for example, Jimeno and Rodríguez-Palenzuela (2002) for the case of youth employment. 4. There 
are, however, counteracting effects. First, participation in these programmes improves individuals’ skills and, therefore, 
their prospects of fi nding a job. And further, it has been argued that the threat of being obliged to participate in an activa-
tion programme may drive the unemployed to seek work more intensely. But, on the other hand, it is possible that pro-
gramme participants will devote less time to job-seeking.
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Trade union density, as a variable that approximates employees’ bargaining power, may ad-
versely affect employment if it translates into excessive wage demands or into the introduction 
of high minimum wages. Nonetheless, the capacity of this variable to capture actual trade 
union power is limited, insofar as the scope of collective bargaining agreements extends auto-
matically to all employees. Finally, the literature has also identifi ed the degree of coordination 
of wage bargaining as another determinant of employment, fi nding that such coordination 
among social agents is conducive to employment.5
All these institutional aspects potentially determining the performance of each country’s 
labour market are measured in the literature with greater or lesser accuracy through vari-
ous indicators. However, it should be borne in mind that such indicators approximate 
what is a complex real situation; accordingly, due caution is required in interpreting them. 
Having regard both to the specific values these indicators adopt and to the labour market 
results in terms of employment, various authors have attempted to classify the European 
countries in different models. Evidently, any such classification tends to be a simplification, 
as it fails to capture – as indicated – the complexity of the institutions in place in each 
country, which is why there is no unanimity as to the economies making up each model. 
Specifically, Sapir (2005) considers four models, namely the Nordic (Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland and the Netherlands), Anglo-Saxon (Great Britain and Ireland), Continental (France, 
Germany, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg) and Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain) models.6
For each of the four models, Chart 1 depicts the simple means of the indicators that measure 
the various above-mentioned institutional aspects, while Chart 2 plots the employment and 
unemployment rates of different groups and the long-term unemployment rate.
The information in the charts tends broadly to confi rm Sapir’s classifi cation. Generally, the 
Nordic model corresponds with the highest replacement rates and the highest spending 
levels, both in active labour market policies and in lifelong learning. The fi nancing of these 
policies leads to relatively high tax wedges. Moreover, the regulation of both labour and prod-
uct markets is among the most lax on the continent. Finally, trade union density is, by far, the 
highest, and the degree of coordination of collective bargaining is high. In terms of results, 
this model posts the highest employment rates, with the highest labour market inclusion for 
women, the young and the over-55s, and the lowest presence of long-term unemployment.
The Anglo-Saxon model is characterised, above all, by low levels of market regulation. Net 
replacement rates are at an intermediate level (although in gross terms they are the lowest) and 
spending on active labour market policies and on lifelong learning is relatively high, despite 
which the tax wedges of these countries are the smallest. Their employment rates are similar 
to those of the Nordic economies.
In the Continental-model countries, market regulation is strict, net replacement rates and 
spending on active policies (though not on lifelong learning) are relatively high and the labour 
5. Further, regarding the degree of centralisation of bargaining, it has been found that, compared with bargaining at the 
economy-wide or at the individual fi rm level, bargaining at the intermediate levels is to the detriment of employment. It 
has been argued that, in fully centralised bargaining, the unions internalise to a greater extent the effects of their wage 
demands on employment in the economy as a whole and, in bargaining at fi rm level, wages approximate more to mar-
ginal productivity [Calmfors and Drifi ll (1988)]. 6. Heipertz and Ward-Warmedinger (2007) compile a different classifi ca-
tion in which the Netherlands does not belong to the Nordic model, and they divide the group of countries in Sapir’s 
Continental and Mediterranean models into reformers (Austria, Belgium and Spain, along with the Netherlands) and non-
reformers (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Luxembourg). Compared with the Sapir classifi cation, Gaard 
(2005) includes Finland in the Continental group and France in the Mediterranean group.
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factor tax wedge is among the highest. This model shows lower employment levels (only 
slightly higher than the Mediterranean countries), with lower employment among the youngest 
and oldest workers.
Finally, labour and product markets under the Mediterranean model evidence the highest lev-
els of regulation. Further, unemployment protection and spending on active policies and on 
lifelong learning are the lowest in Europe. These countries have the lowest employment rates, 
with high incidence of long-term unemployment and greater labour market exclusion for the 
most disadvantaged groups.
Yet as indicated, the classifi cation still shows some oversimplifi ed factors. Table 3 offers an 
overview of the various institutions of the countries belonging to each of the four models. The 
second column refl ects the relative position of the various countries, in terms of their total 
employment rates, as an approximation of the results of their labour markets. The remaining 
columns show the relative order of the countries according to the values of the indicators that 
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INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATION OF EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKET MODELS CHART 1
SOURCES: OECD, Eurostat and Banco de España .
a. OECD. Employment Statistics Database , 2003. Ranges from 0 to 6, so that a higher value denotes a 
higher degree of protection.
b. OECD. Benefits and Wages , 2004. Net replacement rates over a period of five years’ unemployment 
and including social assistance. The average is taken for four household situations (a single individual 
with one or two children and a couple where only one of the two works, with one or two children) and for
two income levels (67% and 100% of the average).
c. OECD. SOCX Social Expenditure Database, 2003. Spending per unemployed individual, expressed 
as a percentage of per capita GDP.
d. Eurostat, 2005. Percentage of the population aged 25-64 who state they have received training or 
education in the four weeks prior to the European Union Labour Force Survey .
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approximate each of the institutional aspects.7 Generally, the characterisations of the Nordic, 
Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean models are also applicable to the countries making up each 
of them, although in each case there are exceptions. It is in the Continental model that hetero-
geneity is greatest, where the average values of the indicators representing each institutional 
characteristic mask notable cross-country dispersion.
As indicated in the introduction, Denmark’s labour market arrangements have been consid-
ered, on the basis of the good results obtained, as a potential model for the other Euro-
pean countries. Specifi cally, the Danish economy is characterised by its having the highest 
total employment rate of all the EU 15 countries (see Table 4). Although, in comparison with 
the European average, greater employment in the Danish economy spans all groups of 
workers by age and sex considered in the table, the differences are more accentuated in 
The Danish fl exicurity 
model
CHART 1
SOURCES: OECD, Eurostat and Banco de España .
e. OECD. Market Regulation , 2003. A higher level denotes a higher degree of regulation.
f. OECD. Taxing Wages , 2004. Difference between gross labour costs borne by employers and 
disposable income for employees, and equivalent to the sum of personal income tax and compulsory 
social security contributions paid by employers and employees, net of benefits in cash, as a percentage 
of gross labour costs. Average of two household situations: an individual with no children who earns the 
average income and a couple with two children where the household head earns the average income.
g. OECD. Employment Statistics Database , 2001. Unionised employees as a proportion of total.
h. OECD. 1995-2000.
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7. Thus, for instance, in the row for Denmark, the country with the highest employment rate in the EU 15, the value in the 
third column shows how this economy has the third most lax employment protection legislation of all the countries con-
sidered.
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the case of women, the young and the over-55s. That indicates that Denmark has been 
more successful in integrating into the labour market the groups of individuals who habitu-
ally fi nd access thereto more diffi cult. Denmark also has the second-highest employment 
rate for women, for the elderly and for the under-24s, exceeded only by Sweden in the fi rst 
two cases and by the Netherlands in the third. Signifi cantly, the labour markets of these 
latter countries belong, like Denmark, to the so-called Nordic model. In addition, Den-
mark’s total unemployment rate is the lowest of all countries considered, and its long-term 
unemployment rate is also one of the lowest.
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Labour market 
outputs
Total
employment
rate
  (1)
Employment
protection
 (2)
Unemploy-
ment
benefits
 (3)
Active
labour market
policies
(4)
Lifelong
learning
(5)
Product
market
regulation
(6)
Tax wedge
on labour
(7)
Trade
union
density
(8)
Coordination
of collective
bargaining
NORDIC 1 2 4 1 1 2 3 4 1
Denmark 1 3 15 1 3 3 8 12 3
Sweden 2 10 12 3 1 4 12 14 10
Netherlands 4 7 13 2 5 8 5 3 3
Finland 6 6 14 11 4 6 9 13 1
ANGLO-SAXON 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 3 4
United Kingdom 3 1 6 9 2 1 2 ND 13
Ireland 8 2 9 5 11 2 1 10 3
CONTINENTAL 3 3 2 3 3 3 4 2 3
Austria 5 4 8 6 6 9 11 9 3
Germany 9 9 11 7 10 10 14 5 3
Luxembourg 11 ND 10 13 8 5 3 7 ND
France 12 12 4 8 12 13 13 1 12
Belgium 13 8 5 4 9 7 15 11 2
MEDITERRANEAN 4 4 1 4 4 4 2 1 2
Portugal 7 14 7 10 14 11 4 4 3
Spain 10 13 3 14 7 12 7 2 10
Greece 14 11 2 15 15 14 6 6 ND
Italy 15 5 1 12 13 15 10 8 3
Labour market institutions
EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND OUTPUTS (a) TABLE 3
SOURCES: OECD, Eurostat and Banco de España
a. For each institution, the ordering of the countries (and models) is on the basis of the sign of the expected effect on the employment rate. Thus, the
order is from higher to lower for spending on active labour market policies, on lifelong learning and on the degree of coordination of collective bargaining, 
as these are assumed to have a positive effect on employment. Conversely, employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits, product market 
regulation, the tax wedge and trade union density are ordered from lower to higher, since their effect on employment is assumed to be negative.
It is tempting to attribute the successful results in the Danish labour market (and in the other 
Nordic economies) to the institutional model underlying its industrial relations. This model has 
been baptised with the term “fl exicurity” owing to the mix of fl exibility in the use of the labour 
factor and of security for the working population. It should be clarifi ed, however, that any la-
bour market model combines ingredients of both types. What distinguishes one model from 
another are the specifi c forms of fl exibility and security that each incorporates and which, 
generally, are related to the different institutional factors discussed above.
Wilthagen, Tros and van Lieshout (2003) consider the possible forms fl exibility and security 
may take in the labour market. In particular, in the case of fl exibility, regard is had to the ease 
with which: a) workers can be hired and fi red (external numerical fl exibility), which is related to 
the degree of laxity of EPL; b) working hours can be adapted to the conjunctural needs of the 
company (internal numerical fl exibility), related to the regulation of the duration of working 
hours; c) the tasks performed by workers (functional fl exibility) can be changed, which de-
pends on the volume and effectiveness of spending on lifelong learning and on active labour 
market policies, and d) wages can respond to labour market conditions and to individual pro-
ductivity (labour costs fl exibility), which is potentially connected to variables such as trade 
union density or the degree of coordination of collective bargaining, insofar as these are capa-
ble of infl uencing the level of minimum wages or the existence or not of wage indexation.
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Security can refer to each of the four following dimensions: a) the probability of keeping one’s cur-
rent job (or job security), measured by the degree of stringency of employment protection legisla-
tion; b) the probability of remaining employed, albeit not necessarily in the same job (employment 
security), for which active labour market and lifelong learning policies are relevant; c) the possibility 
of maintaining a relatively stable level of income (income security), which depends on the design of 
the benefi ts received in the event of unemployment, and d) the ease with which work can be rec-
onciled with one’s private life, e.g. through maternity or study leave (combination security).
It should be noted that, under these arrangements, there are institutional factors with counter-
acting effects on labour market fl exibility and security. This is the case of EPL since, if it is lax, 
it provides external numerical fl exibility at the expense of weakening job security. Conversely, 
greater spending on active labour market policies or on lifelong learning should give rise to 
both higher functional fl exibility and employment security. Lastly, it should be stressed that it is 
not necessarily true that any of the potential combinations of the different types of fl exibility and 
security outlined is desirable for employment.
In the Danish fl exicurity model, fl exibility is obtained via the existence of scant legal restric-
tions to dismissal (high external numerical fl exibility). Since insurance for individuals who al-
ready have a job against the risk of becoming unemployed is low (i.e. job security is low), this 
protection is provided alternatively through the provision of generous unemployment benefi ts 
(income security), although these are subject to strict conditionality requirements. The third 
constituent part of the model is the central role of active labour market policies. These poli-
cies - which include training courses, job-search assistance, programmes for placements in 
both the private and public sectors, and hiring subsidies – are geared to renewing the skills 
of unemployed workers, so as to shorten the periods of transition to their new jobs (employ-
ment security).
It is likely that the strengthening, during the 90s, of this third leg of the model and the tighten-
ing of the conditions governing unemployment benefi t eligibility and its subsequent mainte-
nance can help explain the recent success of the Danish labour market. The lower level of EPL 
and the generosity of unemployment benefi ts had been present in the Danish model before-
hand. However, this did not prevent the unemployment rate rising from the mid-80s to a rate 
of close to 10% in 1993. The subsequent reduction in unemployment, to around 3.3% at 
present, has taken place alongside reforms aimed at changing the emphasis from passive la-
bour market policies (focused on maintaining the income of the unemployed) to active policies 
geared to promoting a return to employment. Specifi cally, eligibility conditions have become 
progressively tighter since 1994, requiring workers to have been employed in the last three 
Average
job
tenure (b)Total
Long-
term (a)
Total
(15-64)
Men
(15-64)
Women
(15-64)
15-24 25-54 55-64
Denmark 4.9 25.9 75.5 80.1 70.8 62.0 83.9 59.8 8.8
EU 14 average (c) 7.5 39.1 65.9 73.4 58.5 39.3 79.0 44.6 10.8
Employment rates by sex and by age groupUnemployment rates
THE DANISH LABOUR MARKET RELATIVE TO THE EUROPEAN AVERAGE (2005) TABLE 4
SOURCES: OECD and Banco de España.
a. Percentage of individuals unemployed for more than one year as a percentage of total unemployed.
b. In years, in the same job.
c. Former EU 15, excluding Denmark.
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years for at least 12 months, instead of six, as was previously the case [Madsen (2002)]. Fur-
ther, the maximum duration of the benefi t receipt period has been cut, having previously been 
unlimited in the early 90s as long as the unemployed accepted to take part in activation pro-
grammes [Andersen and Svarer (2007)]. In practice, this meant at that time that the unemploy-
ment benefi ts system and the activation measures (i.e. the inclusion of workers in a programme 
of active labour market measures) were, overall, aimed more at rolling over benefi t entitlement 
than at getting the unemployed back to work. At present, the maximum duration of the ben-
efi ts is four years, activation being obligatory from the end of the fi rst year (or after only 13 
weeks in the case of workers under 29 years of age). Finally, although there has been a reduc-
tion of approximately 15 pp in the net replacement rate from 1995 to 2003, it remains among 
the highest on the continent.
As indicated, active labour market policies have gained in importance in this period. The 
changes therein have been twofold. First, the proportion of the unemployed participating in 
activation programmes has increased (doubling from 1995 to 2004, up to close to 40%). And 
second, there has been a greater emphasis on programmes more geared to enhancing unem-
ployed individuals’ skills. Among total participants, then, there has been an increase in the 
weight of training programmes (up to over 50%, compared with one-third in 1995). At the 
same time, the share of public-sector employment programmes (generally in low-skill jobs), 
which stood at over 30% in 1995, has been halved. Despite the decline in the number of un-
employed, the rise in the proportion of participants in activation programmes and the fact that, 
under this latter heading, the weight of the more expensive programs has increased, means 
that the overall cost of active labour market policies has held approximately stable at around 
1.8% of GDP.
It is indeed the high cost for public fi nances that is the corollary of this labour market model, 
since both unemployment benefi ts and active policies entail, unlike the protection afforded by 
EPL, public spending. As a result, the tax burden is heavy.
In this section an econometric analysis with panel data is conducted to explore the impact 
of the various labour market institutions described in the second section on employment 
rates. The addition here, compared with other previous contributions in the literature, is 
that the effects of the characteristics of the Danish fl exicurity arrangements are investigat-
ed. As indicated, the Danish model combines low levels of EPL, high spending on active 
labour market policies and high replacement rates (albeit with benefi ts subject to strict 
conditionality), which makes it worthwhile inquiring into the joint effect of these three insti-
tutions on employment. In an attempt to respond to this question, the following fl exicurity 
index has been constructed:
Fp,t = IFp,t – IFDK,t
where the subscript p represents each of the 14 Member States of the EU 15 other than Den-
mark, DK is Denmark and t is the time subscript. Accordingly, Fp,t measures the distance in 
terms of each country’s fl exicurity relative to Denmark. IFp,t is constructed as follows:
 ¦
 
u 
3
1j
j
t,pt,p x3
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IF  
where xp,t
j refers to the indicators of unemployment benefi ts (amount and duration), active labour 
market policies and employment protection legislation of country p, and the decision to give equal 
weights to each of them is arbitrary.8 The fi rst two indicators have a positive sign, since Danish 
An empirical analysis
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fl exicurity is characterised by its high levels of both, while the third indicator has a negative sign 
(since Danish EPL is limited). The time variability of the EPL indicator devised by the OECD is low, 
which hinders the analysis.9 Furthermore, the generosity of unemployment benefi ts should be 
measured through not only their level, but also their duration and conditionality. In this exercise, 
generosity is approximated by means of the gross replacement rate, a variable which does not 
take into account the conditionality of the benefi ts and which captures duration only indirectly, 
since the replacement rate is measured over the course of the fi rst fi ve years following access to 
unemployment status. Accordingly, the duration of benefi ts has an effect on their level.10
Despite its simplicity, the index constructed in this way captures, albeit imperfectly, the distance 
of the various countries’ labour markets relative to the Danish fl exicurity model. As can be seen in 
Chart 3, the reforms to active labour market and unemployment benefi t policies in Denmark in 
1994 led the value of the index to fall for virtually all the countries, as it represented a distancing 
from the Danish fl exicurity model. In contrast, the latest institutional reforms implemented by most 
countries have tended to draw their labour markets closer to that of the Nordic economy. At 
present, according to this index, the country whose labour market is closest to Denmark’s is the 
Netherlands, while those most distant from it are, generally, the Mediterranean countries.
To empirically test the virtues of the Danish model, the following static equation is estimated 
for a sample encompassing the EU 15 countries (excluding Denmark itself, since the fl exicu-
rity index is defi ned relative to this country) in the period 1980-2003:
 ¦ HGJEE 
j
t,p,ipt,p
j
t,pijt,p0it,p,i OGXFE  [1]
8. Each of the three indicators has been normalised by subtracting its average across countries for any given period of 
time and dividing it by its standard deviation, i.e.
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where the capital letters denote the original values of the indicators. 9. Specifi cally, there are only data for three points 
in time: the late 80s, the late 90s and 2003. 10. The indicator of the conditionality of benefi ts constructed in Hasselpfl ug 
(2005) for the EU 15 countries is only available for 1997 and 2004, which prevent it being used. Moreover, it would have 
been preferable to use the replacement rate net of taxes and social security contributions. However, the scant availability 
of data mean gross rates must be resorted to. 
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SOURCES: OECD and Banco de España.
a. Denmark is the country of reference and its flexicurity index takes the value zero for each year.
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where the subscripts i, p and t respectively denote a group of workers (all of them, women, 
the young or the elderly), a country and a point in time. E, Xj and OG are the rate of employ-
ment, the institution j (which is different from the three intervening in the construction of Fp,t) 
and the output gap (for the purposes of controlling for the fl uctuations in employment over the 
cycle). Finally, δp are fi xed effects by country. In the defi nition of the different variables, the 
measurement of the tax wedge refl ects only social security contributions and personal income 
tax, not consumption tax.
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 5. The evidence obtained upholds the vir-
tues of the Danish fl exicurity model, since the indicator constructed here has a positive impact 
on employment in all the population groups considered, with the exception of women, where 
it is not signifi cant. Most of the remaining effects are of the expected sign. In particular, the tax 
wedge adversely affects the employment rates of all the population groups, while lifelong 
learning has a positive bearing (although the effect is not signifi cant in the case of total employ-
ment). Greater regulation of product markets diminishes the total and female employment 
rates, without impacting signifi cantly the remaining groups of workers. The degree of coordi-
nation of collective bargaining has a sign contrary to that expected. Finally, the equations for 
the specifi c groups of workers include some additional variables. Thus, in the case of the fe-
male population, it is found that longer duration for maternity leave leads to higher employment 
rates. This is not the case, however, for family cash benefi ts. The restrictions on early retire-
ment promote employment of the over-55s and a higher level of educational attainment among 
the young means that this group of workers tends to remain outside the labour market for 
longer, which can probably be explained by the fact that university students belong to this age 
group.11
The interest shown by European policymakers in transplanting the concept of fl exicurity into 
the other EU countries leads to questions about the extent to which the success of the Danish 
labour market is attributable to this model. This debate implicitly suggests that the reforms to 
labour markets should be undertaken under an overall approach that were simultaneously to 
address a reduction in EPL and an increase in spending on active labour market policies, and 
to maintain high replacement rates (albeit with benefi ts subject to conditionality). Although the 
empirical testing of the fl exicurity model is not straightforward, the evidence obtained supports 
the hypothesis that labour market reforms along the lines of the three fl exicurity ingredients 
would raise employment rates.
Yet it is not possible to rule out completely that the Danish results may be due, at least in part, to 
factors unrelated to Denmark’s current labour market arrangements. For one thing, the reforms in 
the recent stage have coincided with the implementation of stability-geared macroeconomic 
policies and, in particular, with a sharp fi scal adjustment based on the containment of spending. 
For another, it has been noted that there is some tendency to overstate the merits of models that 
work well for a certain period of time [EEAG (2007)]. Thus, for example, the Japanese model of 
lifelong employment and the German arrangements based on vocational training and worker 
participation in management decisions, which were lauded in the 80s, fell out of favour a decade 
later when both countries underwent a prolonged period of economic stagnation.
11. Numerous papers in the literature have estimated similar equations to that set out here, in which the three institutions 
intervening in the construction of Fp,t enter separately. Most frequently in these cases, the dependent variable is the un-
employment rate. One study that referred to the (aggregate) employment rates is that by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005). 
For the sample used in this article, the estimation of [1] with free parameters for EPL, unemployment benefi ts and active 
labour market policies provides results in line with those expected: the latter of these variables positively affects the em-
ployment rates of all the population groups, while the fi rst two variables affect them adversely, although spending on 
active labour market policies is only signifi cant in the cases of total and female employment. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 139 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JANUARY 2008 FLEXICURITY AS A MODEL FOR EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS
There is broad consensus on the need to reform European labour markets and welfare bene-
fi ts systems, so that they may provide the appropriate incentives to stimulate an increase in the 
use of the labour factor. However, a frequent interpretation is that the relatively low rates of 
employment observed in many European countries are an almost inevitable corollary of the 
preference of European societies for job stability and insurance against the risk of unemploy-
ment, since the institutions covering these objectives are inclined to discourage job creation. 
These preferences would be responsible for reforming zeal coming up frequently against op-
position from the social agents, which ultimately weakens such zeal.
Against this background, the Danish labour market model has aroused growing interest in 
economic policy debate, as it seems to act as a counterexample to the alleged diffi culties of 
reconciling employment incentives with the protection that workers demand. Accordingly, the 
term fl exicurity, used to designate this model, has been resolutely incorporated into European 
economic policy discussions. The conclusions of the March 2006 European Summit invited 
the Commission to explore “the development of a set of common principles on fl exicurity”. In 
response, the Commission released a Communication in late June 2007 that will act as the 
basis for the adoption of such common principles by the European Council before the end of 
the year, so that they may inspire the forthcoming cycle of the Employment Guidelines, which 
begins in 2008. Foreseeably, these Guidelines will call on the Member States to report, in 
their National Reform Programmes, on the fl exicurity strategies implemented. In turn, the 
Commission will review the strategies in its Annual Progress Reports.
However, for the Danish experience to point the way for other countries, a correct interpreta-
tion of this experience is required. The model in place until the mid-90s, based on fl exible 
Conclusions
Variable Total Men Women
Young
(15-24)
Elderly
(55-64)
Flexicurity index 1.32 ** 1.48 ** 0.78 4.20 ** 0.76 *
Tax wedge -0.27 ** -0.37 ** -0.31 ** -0.42 ** -0.45
Trade union density -0.06 ** 0.09 ** -0.17 ** 0.12 ** -0.02
Coordination of collective 
bargaining -0.10 -0.53 ** 0.37 -1.34 ** -0.78 **
Lifelong learning 0.44 ** 0.35 ** 0,56 ** 0.64 ** 0.51 **
Product market 
regulation -1.25 ** 0.31 -1.98 ** 0.61 -0.01
Output gap 0.41 ** 0.47 ** 0.31 0.64 ** 0.11 *
Familly cash benefits
-2.23 **
Female education 0.30
Maternity leave duration 0.03 **
Relative youth education -2.99 *
Standard age of eligibility
to pension benefits 0.29 **
Between-groups R2 0.50 0.51 0.64 0.50 0.36
Intra-groups R2 0.43 0.32 0.01 0.49 0.47
Total R2 0.44 0.37 0.18 0.52 0.47
Dependent variable: total rate of employment and employment by grou
SOURCES: Banco de España.
a. **/* indicates that the variable is significant at 5%/10%. The significant variables have been 
shaded.
EMPLOYMENT EQUATIONS: FLEXICURITY. 1980-2003 (a) TABLE 5
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 140 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JANUARY 2008 FLEXICURITY AS A MODEL FOR EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS
hiring and fi ring rules and on generous unemployment benefi ts, was costly and did not pre-
vent a sustained high unemployment rate. The labour market situation improved substan-
tially when the emphasis shifted from passive incomes policies towards active labour market 
policies. Although the reform of unemployment benefi ts entailed a reduction in their level, this 
remains high. The fundamental change was the shortening of the duration of the benefi t re-
ceipt period, both directly and through the conditions linked to activation. The aim of active 
policies is to equip workers with the necessary skills to smooth the transition to different jobs 
during their working life. The outcome is high labour market turnover. On one hand, since 
EPL is limited, companies are less reluctant to engage new hires. On the other, although the 
risk of unemployment is relatively high, the periods of unemployment duration tend to be 
shorter thanks to the training received through activation programmes (which, moreover, al-
low workers to be - at least in theory - increasingly productive). This experience points to the 
need for a balanced application of the different components of the model, so as to maximise 
its effectiveness.
Finally, while accepting that the three basic features of the Danish fl exicurity model are re-
sponsible for the healthy state of Denmark’s labour market, that does not necessarily mean 
that its characteristics may or should be exactly replicated by other Member States. Firstly, 
each country has its own institutional framework, in which the actual materialisation of any of 
these elements may prove diffi cult or complicated to implement in practice. In particular, it 
has been said that the Danish fl exicurity model is not even the result of a deliberate policy 
strategy, but rather of protracted institutional developments over time based on successive 
commitments entered into by social agents.12 Secondly, the Danish model involves, as indi-
cated, a high cost for public fi nances, which in turn translates into a high tax wedge on la-
bour, with the subsequent adverse effects on labour supply. Probably, the model’s costs are 
more bearable in the presence of sectoral shocks, since in that case what it permits is pre-
cisely a rapid re-absorption of the resulting unemployment in other sectors. Nonetheless, the 
presence of economy-wide shocks might result in very substantial increases in spending. In 
this respect, the model’s high cost would mean that it might not be appropriate, at least ini-
tially, in countries with a high budget defi cit and high unemployment rate, since it would be 
more diffi cult to assume the increase in spending in those circumstances.
15.11.2007.
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